

Rebuilding American Security: Project Report

*Rebuilding American Security:
Democratization in Korea and Indonesia and Implications for US Foreign Policy*

Purpose and Design

The project was conceived in the summer of 2004 a few months after the invasion of Iraq and at a time when international concern about the basic direction of US foreign and security policy was rising dramatically in most parts of the world. Public opinion polls in virtually all countries in Asia (India and the Philippines being the two exceptions) were showing a decisive turn against America's approach that seemed to emphasize unilateralism, arrogance, and exceptionalism. We observed that the Asian reactions to the Bush administration's basic strategic directions were more muted in the host of trans-Pacific security dialogue fora than they were in private discussions with the same individuals. And we detected what we later labeled the "dual gap" that was separating, first, US and Asian approaches to a range of security issues and, second, governments in Asia that were pragmatically adjusting to shifts in US policy from their publics and intellectual communities that were increasingly critical.

The aim was to create a process that would allow for a freer exchange of views among Americans and Asians knowledgeable about America. The discussion was intended to focus on US security policies in a post-9/11 setting and to be based upon a strong factual base comprised of detailed analysis of public opinion surveys, formal governmental relations, and the factors influencing US policy-making.

At a planning meeting in California in the fall of 2004 we decided to focus the project more sharply by concentrating on the "dual gap" in the context of two countries, South Korea and Indonesia. These two countries were selected in part because of their regional importance; in part because they were crucial to the management of, respectively, American-led efforts at countering proliferation and terrorism; and in part because both were undergoing democratic transitions.

The emergence of new and strong voices on policy matters, volatility in public attitudes and voting patterns, and re-configured processes for policy formulation all contributed to making views of the United States and US foreign policy more complicated, more pluralistic, and less easy to manage. In short, democratization in Asia presents new challenges for the people of the region as well as the United States. The common bond of democratic institutions and values may not augur well for the easy management of bilateral relations or the management of public attitudes and participation. In the words of one participant, the current US administration may be better at promoting the idea of democracy than managing relations with newly-founded democracies.

Activities

- Preparation and dissemination of an initial concept paper written in November 1994 and revised in March 2005. It is attached as *Appendix I* below.
- A planning meeting in Los Angeles on 14 November 2004.
- A major workshop in Seoul 10-11 May 2005, on "America in Question: Korean Democracy and the Challenge of Non-Proliferation on the Peninsula". Organized in cooperation with the East Asia Institute which also made a financial contribution. Included about 45 participants, two thirds from South Korea and the remainder composed of the core group and additional participants from the US and Indonesia. A full report, including copies of the commissioned papers, is available online at:

<http://www.ligi.ubc.ca/collateral/common/index.cfm?fuseaction=view&pageName=publications&contentID=645§ion=Information&subSection=Publications>

- A copy of the summary report is included as an attachment to this narrative.
- A major workshop in Jakarta 27-29 January 2006 on "America in Question: Indonesian Democracy and Counter-Terrorism in Southeast Asia." Organized in cooperation with the Centre for Strategic and International Studies. It included about 55 participants, with about

three-quarters from Indonesia and one remainder from the US, Canada, Japan, Singapore and South Korea. A full report, including the concept paper and commissioned papers, is available online at:

<http://www.ligi.ubc.ca/collateral/common/index.cfm?fuseaction=view&pageName=publications&contentID=936§ion=Information&subSection=Publications>

- Preparation of concept papers for participants in both workshops, available as part of the online workshop reports.
- E-dissemination of "US-Asia Security Brief," a twice-monthly summary of key reports and analyses of US foreign policy produced by a research group based at the Liu Institute in Vancouver. The summaries are attached.

Substantive Findings and Results

Overarching findings and observations are as follows:

- There was a high level of anxiety in both countries, even among American-friendly elites, about specific American policies and attitudes. While participants understood the pragmatic reasons why their governments were careful in voicing opposition to US policies and sought to maximize bilateral benefits, they voiced harsh assessments of inconsistencies in US policy, and an unwillingness to listen, abandonment of moral leadership, and hypocrisy in applying American values.
- This is not simple or emotional "anti-Americanism". Even among almost all of those who raised the sharpest criticisms, there was strong receptivity to the "American" values of freedom and tolerance; most look to the US as the model of democracy; and most welcome an ongoing American leadership role in foreign affairs. The criticisms were carefully reasoned and articulated. Rather than rejecting America, the main refrain was that America should reconnect with its own traditions and values.
- It proved difficult in both Seoul and Jakarta to get beyond the immediate context of bilateral relations with the US and the specific issues under discussion, counter-proliferation and counter-terrorism respectively, to look at broader dimensions of US policy in the context of the United Nations and international organizations or basic principles such as maximum spectrum supremacy. The passion and intensity of reactions to US views in particular national contexts dominated.
- There is a widely-held view in South Korea and Indonesia that the United States is better at promoting democracy than accommodating it. Senior leaders in Washington have considerable experience in managing diverse points of view on foreign policy within the US, but they seem to be having difficulty absorbing the increasing diversity of opinion within Asian societies that are becoming more open and democratic. Democratizing governments in Asia face a similar challenge. They have long had to adjust to public opinion as an influence on US foreign policy, but not at home. These tendencies are made more complex by the tendency of the media to emphasize differences and amplify shifts in public attitudes.
- There was a strong view in both that top American leaders do not adequately understand local conditions and priorities. And in both there was a strong consensus that intellectual elites at home had an inadequate understanding of the drivers of policy in the US. This is especially disturbing in the context of the US-Korean relationship where there is a formal alliance and a long and deep tradition of academic and other exchanges.
- In both Indonesia and Korea, democratization has led to the emergence of a wider range of groups having a voice in foreign policy issues through a largely unconstrained media and political parties. A combination of nationalism and democracy makes the management of bilateral relations increasingly complex.
- In looking at ways that mutual comprehension can be advanced, it is no longer adequate for Washington to deal exclusively or even primarily with governmental elites. Public diplomacy conceived of as ongoing contact and dialogue with civil society actors will be essential to repairing and enhancing America's image and influence.
- Public diplomacy alone is not enough. As argued by most of the participants, public diplomacy cannot succeed without American leaders recapturing moral leadership on the global stage, reaffirming the values of international institutions, and taking a broader on regional issues that extends beyond a single-issue fix of non-proliferation in the case of Korea

- and counter-terrorism in Indonesia and the Muslim world.
- The presence of the common value of democracy and the institutions of democracy do not necessarily outweigh differences in identities and interests. Volatility, diversity and complexity in public opinion and public policy are not likely to diminish in future.
 - Democratization may be eroding support for traditional balance of power concepts and Cold War mindsets. Most Koreans appear to want significant adjustments in the US-ROK alliance and more emphasis on multilateral and cooperative security arrangements in Northeast Asia and on an East Asian basis (e.g. ASEAN Plus Three). And in Indonesia, there is growing support for the government to show leadership in establishing an ASEAN Security Community.
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APPENDIX I

Rebuilding American Security: Is There a New Trans-Pacific Gap? How Can it be Narrowed?

Prepared by Paul Evans

11 November 2004 (revised 18 March 2005)*

Despite unprecedented power and preponderance, the United States feels more threatened by forces outside its borders than at any point since the Second World War. The threats that it faces are complex and compelling. They are complex in that they extend beyond traditional inter-state actors to include non-state actors connected to terrorism and new weapons of mass destruction.

That they are compelling is demonstrated by the fact that Americans feel increasingly vulnerable and are devoting enormous resources to protecting against perceived vulnerabilities.

American security policy under President Bush has responded to these threats in a way that reflects heightened American power and heightened American fear. It is not just a series of responses to specific situations and individual threats but represents what most now believe is a fundamental shift in security doctrine and the U.S. role in the world. The main dimensions of this new approach were evident in the inclinations of the President and several of his main advisors prior to his victory in November 2000. September 11th was the catalyst for putting them into action.

The new approach, argue Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay, is built on two core beliefs. First, in a dangerous world U.S. must "shed the constraints imposed by friends, allies and international institutions." The U.S. is the most likely target and cannot rely on others to afford protection or limit its primacy by participation in formal arrangements. [1]

Second, an America unbound should use its strength to change the status quo in the world. This has included a military invasion of Iraq, aspirations to introduce democracy into the Middle East, a commitment, when necessary, to regime change and act against rogue states. This has not entailed a strategy of disengagement from the world or neo-isolationism but rather, as noted in the 9/11 Commission's report, seeing the planet as America's homeland.

Many at home and abroad question whether the approach of the Bush administration is responsible, effective or durable, though the reelection of the President on November 2nd suggests that for at least four more years it will be the foundation of American policy. The focus of this paper is not the correctness of the new security strategy but rather the international attention and response it has generated, especially in East Asia.

The purpose of this brief essay is to profile the pattern of these responses (mainly the negative ones) and to examine what some have described as a widening gap in perceptions and policies separating the U.S. from its friends, allies, and partners across the Pacific. The basic argument is that while there has been a surge of anti-Americanism in most parts of Asia and substantial criticism of several aspects of American policy and strategic doctrine, there is not yet taken the form of the gap that has developed between the U.S. and some of its key partners in from Europe. This does not diminish the

possibility of major confrontations with governments in Asia and elsewhere. Nor does it deny that there are deep divisions within the United States itself about security policy or a divide in some countries in East Asia separating government policies from public opinion. But it is to suggest that that there is more common ground than might have been expected that can be used to build a dialogue on the best way of responding to the more dangerous security environment that the United States faces.

The International Response

It is undeniable that American foreign and security policy in the period after September 11th has been the subject of intense controversy and debate in much of the world. In addition to the images of fashion models sporting t-shirts depicting the slogan "I'm afraid of Americans", polls in the UK indicating that the British believe George W. Bush to be a worse and more dangerous man than Saddam Hussein, movie cinemas in Pakistan being burned to the ground for showing American movies, the accumulation of news-stories describing manifestations of anti-American sentiment is long and pungent. Virtually every international survey indicates that while support for American values remains high, respect for the U.S. has declined precipitously. A recent Pew study indicates that two thirds of Americans feel their country is less respected by other countries than in the past.[2]

It appears that the most intensely critical views of American policy come from the Middle East and that these views are now becoming prevalent in other parts of the Muslim world. According to a Pew study, "the bottom has fallen out of support for America in most of the Muslim world," with negative views of the U.S. spreading to Muslim populations in Indonesia and Nigeria.[3]

Criticisms of US security policy have centred mainly on specific actions such as the invasion of Iraq, the approach to the Israel-Palestine conflict, and initiatives such as Ballistic Missile Defence. Beyond specific policies, concerns have been voiced about the worldview and philosophy guiding U.S. policy in at least four areas.

1. A strategic outlook that appears to be aiming to transform the unipolar moment into the unipolar era by seeking "maximum spectrum supremacy," and constraining potential peer competitors or coalitions of competitor states.
2. A radical departure on the use of force from existing ideas of containment, deterrence and sovereignty in the direction of preemption, preventive defence, and regime change.
3. A diminished interest in international institutions and a preference for "coalitions of the willing" rather than rule-based multilateral institutions whether these be alliance systems like NATO or organizations like the United Nations. U.S. "unilateralism" and "exceptionalism" are seen to underwrite diminished commitment to specific international conventions and treaties (e.g. landmines, the International Criminal Court, Kyoto, CTBT). The U.S. appears to be placing its faith in power and resolve rather than international institutions or treaties.
4. An approach to fighting global terrorism that has emphasized military instruments and put it on a collision course with Islamic societies.

Europeans are from Venus

Criticisms are one thing; policy differences another. While there has never been a grand alliance or accord between the U.S. and the major countries in the Middle East and Asia, there certainly has been across the Atlantic. There are genuine fears that the trans-Atlantic compact is dead or at least unraveling. Mainstream media in Europe have skewered President Bush and taken aim at American arrogance, ignorance, bullying, disregard for international law and human rights, inflammatory rhetoric and bad policies, especially in the Middle East. On several occasions mass demonstrations have made the same points in noisier fashion. Cultural and social critiques of the U.S. have ranged far beyond foreign policy to focus on social conservatism, domestic policies on abortion, gun control and the death penalty, etc.

Among officials and policy elites, trans-Atlantic disagreements have been heated and intense about specific policies and broader issues of philosophy and strategy. Francis Fukuyama has argued that Americans and Europeans now view the role and importance of international law as well as the sources of legitimacy in the international arena very differently. To this end, he stated that "an enormous gulf has opened up in American and European perceptions about the world, and the sense

of shared values is increasingly frayed."[4]

This sentiment was emphasized by Robert Kagan, who wrote memorably that "on major strategic and international questions today, Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus: They agree on little and understand one another less and less." Americans as a people are perceived by Europeans to be more violent, obsessed with guns, and "dominated by a culture of death", and America as a country is war-oriented and is likely to use military means to accomplish its international political agenda. Alternatively, Americans have come to view Europeans as "annoying, irrelevant and naïve."[5]

Words like "gap," "rift," and "profound differences" are frequently used. This poses real threats to the alliance system, U.S-Europe cooperation on a range of international issues, and, more fundamentally, to the idea of the West.

As a host of writers have argued, the gap between American and European attitudes may not be as large or serious as it appears. Alternatively, there may be real divides but they can be bridged.[6]

Clearly, Europe does not speak with a single voice. Some governments have been supportive of the Bush administration's approach to key issues, including Iraq. And even those governments most critical of the US, especially France and Germany, agree on many specifics. More importantly, whether or not there is an unbridgeable divide, there has been broad and deep effort to build new bridges or repair old ones. These may or may not be successful but they make explicit the areas of difference and try to address them.

And Asians are From...?

Journalists, intellectuals and officials in Asia have voiced criticisms of the Bush administration's security policies and strategy, but compared to their European counterparts they have done so with less vitriol and with less notice, at least in English-language media. In public forums, and regional meetings there are frequent references to unilateralism, arrogance and wrong-headed policies. There is grumbling, complaining, ringing of hands, resentment, and occasional outrage. A summary of views of Asian leaders expressed in security forums in Southeast Asia in June 2004 highlighted "a growing disconnect between the U.S. and its closest friends in Asia", "a growing gap between the U.S. and its friends in Asia [that] could begin to undermine security alliances," and "erosion of support of popular support for pro-American Asian governments."[7]

One line of criticism is that the U.S. may be effective in attacking terrorists and rogue states but is overlooking the issues of equality and stability in the global order and hence losing its moral authority. In the days immediately after the reelection of President Bush, there have been comments from Asian commentators along the lines that "respect for the United States is at a historic low... The key factor that underlies U.S. unpopularity -and the U.S. has never been more unpopular-is not any specific policy, but the simple fact that the U.S. is No. 1. That makes everybody uncomfortable."[8]

Rarely has this spilled over into sustained debates with proponents of US policy or governmental opposition to US security policies in the region or globally. It is not surprising that virtually all of the statements from US officials including James Kelly and Colin Powell make little mention of Asian criticisms and tend to paint a picture of convergence across the Pacific on the main lines of US security policy. Whatever the mood on the street, almost all Asian governments have strengthened bilateral ties with Washington since September 11th. South Korea, Japan, and the Philippines have sent troops to Iraq. US efforts to introduce counter terrorism into regional groupings including APEC and the ARF have been generally successful. More significantly, several Asian states and organizations, including ASEAN, have actively taken up the cause of anti-terrorism.

There is no doubting a surge of anti-Americanism, but it is not easy to characterize the result as a gap or divide.

The Asian difference can be explained in several ways. Asian connections with the United States have generally been built on common interests rather than common values. Value gaps, rather than convergence, are the norm. One possibility is that despite disagreements with specific aspects of US security policies, most governments support the new strategy and philosophy. At least in some parts

of Asia, the commitment to principled multilateralism, regional and global institutions, and universal human rights, is less firm.

A second explanation is that the dependence of most Asian countries on US markets and some of them on US security alliances has made them much more careful and circumspect in criticizing US positions.

A third is that there is not a regional institution that can focus Asian reactions or shape an Asian identity. Not only is Asia less far down a multilateral path, its key states have not internalized the values or identity of multilateralism.

Eastern Asia's Concerns

Before going too far down the path that Asian publics and elites support or at least defer to America's new global role and approach to security, we need to consider the following:

- There have been public demonstrations against US security policies, mainly in South Korea, Malaysia and Indonesia.
- In a recent public opinion study about the American Presidential election in 35 countries, six of which are in Asia (China, India, Indonesia, Japan, Philippines and Thailand), Kerry was preferred in five of the six, by figures ranging from 52/12 (China) to 57/34 (Indonesia). Only in the Philippines was Bush preferred by 57/32. Asked whether the foreign policy of President Bush made the respondent feel better or worse about the US, in all but one the answer was "worse", ranging from 52/9 in Japan to 49/44 in Indonesia. In the Philippines the answer was "better" 58/27. [9]
- A virtual industry has emerged among Chinese officials and academics for advocating "multi-polarity" and looking at ways to build and strengthen multilateral institutions and reinforce many of the arms control regimes that Washington is rejecting.
- In the context of the UN several Asian governments have voiced strong objections to the new American approach on Iraq, preventive defence, nation building, sovereignty and intervention outside a U.N. mandate.
- There are preliminary signs of discussion in some quarters of using Asian-based international institutions such as the ASEAN Plus Three process as potential vehicles for counter-balancing American power and influence. These ideas are corridor talk rather than official policy but are in striking contrast to the complete absence of this kind of discussion four years ago.

We have not yet done the research to map the pattern of national and regional responses at the level of officials, policy elites and publics across East Asia. It appears that the strongest opposition in East Asia to U.S. security strategy is in the Islamic countries, Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei but the pattern is a very complex one.

Perhaps the most important test case of the gap thesis is in South Korea. South Korea is a close US ally, firmly connected in economic and human terms to the US, a democracy with an increasingly active civil society, committed to a market economy, and an active player in regional and global institutions. It shares a peninsula with a government in the North labeled by President Bush part of an "axis of evil" and a "rogue state," and is thus a front line state and player in various initiatives intended at keeping the world's most dangerous weapons out of the hands of the world's most irresponsible regime, and the poster child for American-led efforts as Ballistic Missile Defence and the Proliferation Security Initiative.

The pattern of South Korean responses, thinking and policy may not be identical or even similar to other countries in East Asia. But the deterioration in US-ROK relations in the past four years not only raises serious questions about the future of the alliance but also about the broader trend in regional security affairs. There is hard evidence of a growing gap in perceptions and policies that not only put the alliance in question but give some hints about the possibility of regional realignment in Northeast Asia.

Koreans Are From Mars (But Moving to Venus?)

- US-ROK relations are at their most difficult and uncertain moment in more than fifty years. The alliance remains intact, South Korean troops support the American-led effort in Iraq. But tensions have emerged at several levels and on several issues. These include:
- Differences on how to handle North Korea, including the tactics and objectives of the Six Party Talks, the sequencing of economic assistance to the North, and specific new programs including Theatre Missile Defence and the Proliferation Security Initiative. Key is harmonizing the two positions. Differing views of China, especially on the value of a rising China and whether or not it represents a strategic threat to the US and Northeast Asia.
- Differing views of Japan's changing military posture.
- General US security policy including a perceived penchant for unilateralism in global affairs. A recent summary of press reactions in Seoul proclaimed that "the ideologically divided South Korean press had a common message it wanted to deliver to re-elected President George W. Bush: 'Jettison your unilateralism and consult more with the international community.'"[10]
- Local-level tensions related to bases and the Status of Force Agreement
- Announced changes in the decrease and redeployment of American forces based in South Korea.

At the level of public opinion, a recent survey conducted by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations indicates a complex pattern of similarities and differences between public attitudes in the two countries. [11]

- Publics in both countries reject the idea that the US has an obligation to play the role of world policeman (56% in Korea; 76% in US), both believe it is playing this role more than it should (74% in South Korea; 80% in US), and both believe that their governments should take part in US peacekeeping forces when asked (83% in Korea; 78% in US) (pp. 8-10).
- In identifying critical threats to their country, international terrorism is identified by 61% of Koreans and 75% of Americans; American unilateralism by 50% of Koreans; North Korea becoming a nuclear power by 59% of Koreans and 64% of Americans; development of China as a world power by 46% of Koreans and 33% of Americans (p.11).
- South Koreans and Americans have generally positive views of each other (average of 58 degrees on the thermometer of Korean feelings about the US; 49 degrees by Americans about South Korea) but very different feelings about China (58 degrees by Koreans; 44 degrees by Americans) and North Korea (46 degrees by Koreans; 28 degrees by Americans).[12]
- Both publics reject preventive war (supported by 10% in Korea, 17% in US) but they are sharply divided on whether war is permissible only after an attack (supported by 34% in Korea and 24% in US) or on the basis of preemption in the face of an imminent attack (26% support in Korea; 53% in US). South Koreans oppose the use of nuclear weapons in any situation while Americans support the use of nuclear weapons in response to a nuclear attack.
- A majority of Southeast Koreans support the creation of an East Asian community that excludes the United States.
- South Koreans have slightly warmer feelings toward international institutions than Americans.
- A large majority of South Koreans view the US as beneficial to South Korea's security and want the US forces stationed there to act as a stabilizer for the East Asia as a whole. South Koreans believe the US would defend their country from a North Korean attack while Americans only support doing so when US efforts would be part of a UN-sponsored operation.
- South Koreans believe the number of US troops in South Korea but could accept a reduction and anticipate US troops remaining for a considerable time but not permanently. Americans believe the US has too many troops in South Korea and that a reduction would have no net effect on South Korean security.
- South Koreans are willing to accept US military action against North Korea over its nuclear weapons program if negotiations fail and if the action has UN approval.

Shifts in Korean opinion have been explained in several ways, some focusing on the new views of a younger generation of Koreans who do not have direct memories of the Korean war, a resurgent nationalism, the change in political regimes in Seoul, poor policy coordination between Washington

and Seoul, politicization of US-ROK relations, and management of specific incidents including the death of two Korean girls in June 2002.

Americans Are from Mars (At least Most are)

The comparative survey data from the Chicago Council study provides part of the picture. Another part is provided by another Chicago Council study of which the US-Korean comparison was a portion. The American component of the survey was based on interviews in July 2004 with a random sample of 1195 Americans and separate interviews with 450 "leaders" with foreign policy power, specialization and expertise (e.g. Congressional members or their senior staff, academics, journalists, administrative officials religious leaders, business and union executives, leaders of NGOs and interest groups). [13]

Some of the key findings are as follows:

- The sense of critical threat from international terrorism, chemical and biological weapons, and unfriendly countries become nuclear powers are all down from 2002 (for terrorism 75% as compared to 85%; for c&b weapons 66% as compared to 82%; for new nuclear powers 64% as compared to 83%) (p.12).
- Combating international terrorism is seen as a very important goal by 87% of leaders but only 71% of the public, the public figure down 13% from 2002 (p.13).
- On defense spending, of the public 25% favor cutting it back, 44% keeping it the same, and 29% increasing it. Respective figures for leaders are 35, 48 and 15. On military aid to other nations, of the public 65% favor cutting the amount; 28% keeping it the same and 5% expanding it. Respective numbers for leaders are 40, 42 and 13 (p.15).
- Approximately two-thirds of the American public (67%) and nearly all leaders (97%) say the US should take an active part in world affairs rather than stay out of world affairs. 76% of the public say that the US should not play the role of the world's policeman and 80% say that the US is currently playing the role of world policeman more than it should be (p. 18)
- 73% of the public and 84% of the leaders say that the US needs to work more closely with other countries to fight terrorism, with only 23% of the public and 9% of leaders saying the US needs to act on its own to fight terrorism (p. 18).
- In assessing the measures to combat terrorism, 87% of the public and 94% of leaders favour working through the UN to strengthen international laws against terrorism and to make sure UN members enforce them; 82% of the public and 80% of leaders support trying suspected terrorists at the International Criminal Court; 76% of the public but only 36% of leaders favour restricting immigration into the U.S.; 64% of the public and 94% of the leaders favour helping countries develop their economies; and 64% of the public and 89% of the leaders favour making a major effort to be even-handed in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; of the public, 23% favour more emphasis on military means and 45% more emphasis on diplomatic and economic means; of leaders, 6% favour more emphasis on military means and 73% favour more emphasis on diplomatic and economic means (p. 19-20).
- "A striking and unprecedented finding of this study is that there is not a clear majority of the public and leaders who support states taking action on their own to prevent other states from acquiring weapons of mass destruction but a majority does support it if this action is deemed appropriate by the UN Security Council" (p.23). Only 17% of the public and 10% of leaders support a unilateral right to go to war if they have strong evidence that the other country is acquiring weapons of mass destruction that be used against them at some point in future. 53% of the public and 61% of the leaders support unilateral military action only if there is strong evidence that there an imminent danger of being attacked by the other country. 24% and 25% believe there is a unilateral right to go to war only if the other country attacks them first (p. 25). [14]
- In the specific case of North Korea, using military force to destroy North Korea's nuclear capability was supported by about 66% with UN approval and 48% without it (p.26).
- "One of the most striking findings of this study is the degree of willingness Americans show for collective decision making in the international sphere. Despite the arguments that the United States should not be bound by the restrictions of international institutions and the opinions of others, Americans seem to be taking the opposite view. Both the public and leaders (66% and 78% respectively) agree that when dealing with international problems, the United States should be more willing to make decisions within the United Nations, even if this

- means that the United States will have to along with a policy that is not its first choice" (p.32).
- 87% of the public and 85% support American participation in prohibition of nuclear testing; 80% of each support participation in the treaty that bans all use of landmines; 76% of the public and 70% of leaders support American participation in the International Criminal Court; and 71% and 72% respectively support American participation in the Kyoto agreement (p. 36). In a curious twist, only 30% of the leaders (and only 9% of Republican staffers) estimate that a majority of the public support American participation in the ICC. [15] The level of public support for the Kyoto agreement is also considerably underestimated by leaders (p.50-51).

The implications of the study and others deserve attention and reflection. On first blush, the differences between the public and leaders opinions and the policies of the U.S. government are striking. If the study accurately reflects the feelings of the respondents (and if the questions were the right ones), one of the largest gaps is between the leaders and public, on the one hand, and the Bush administration on the other. It also signals that American opinion is not so far apart from that in other countries on a variety of issues related to the use of force and multilateral institutions. [16]

This rough overview of issues and attitudes in Korea and in the context of US-Korean comparisons leads to three tentative conclusions.

First, the alliance is in need of substantial restructuring with the status quo neither desirable nor sustainable as seen by both sides. One respected analyst concludes that "The alliance appears demonstrably less important to both Americans and South Koreans than it was during the Cold War." [17]. A reassessment of the alliance is in order but will take place in a context of heightened anti-Americanism, disagreements about how to deal with North Korea, South Korean anxiety about the main lines of US security policy, uncertainty about US force structure in the face of a changing strategic approach, stronger connections between South Korea and China, the emergence of an East Asian "regionality" that takes place without US participation, growing civil-military tensions over the US footprint, democratization and generational shifts in South Korea, and the rise of NGOs and civic action groups. The decision of the Roh government to send troops to support the American-led operation in Iraq, like a similar one in Japan, was opposed by a large majority of Koreans. The decision to accommodate the American request in order to insure American support for vital security concerns closer to home may have been good statecraft. But it points to a division between the public and policy makers that constitutes a democratic deficit that will be hard to sustain in the long term.

Second, there remains a high potential for direct US-ROK confrontation on North Korea policy, especially if (a) Seoul is asked to close off its economic connections with the North as part of a new phase of coercive diplomacy to force concessions on the North's nuclear program or (b) the US takes direct action aimed at regime change in the North or some kind of preventive military action against North Korea.

Third, at a broader level of generalization, the idea of a single gap separating the US from Asia is misleading. It may be fair to say that while public attitudes differ on several issues, there do seem to be fairly strong commonalities on the virtues of multilateral processes for legitimating and orchestrating the use of force. But there are various kinds of gaps, both within individual countries and among them. The largest gap, as indicated in the final months of the Presidential race, may be within the United States itself. A Pew Study in August 2004 observes that "on foreign policy, red and blue voters are worlds apart," that "Bush and Kerry voters see the world differently" and that "Americans have grown increasingly divided on fundamental policy questions." [18]

There may be what The Economist calls an "American consensus" as seen in Congressional politics, national expenditures and the 9/11 Commission report that the U.S. is engaged in a global war on terrorism, that high levels of military expenditures are necessary, and that power must be projected abroad to win that war, acting alone if necessary. [19]

But the consensus does not extend into instruments for making that war effective, ideas of preventive defence, or specific means for dealing with proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and associated issues, including how they play out on the Korean peninsula.

Endnotes

* Excerpts from a background paper prepared for the planning group meeting on "Rebuilding American Security", Marina del Ray, California, 14 November 2004. Thanks to Tania Keefe and Mario Canseco for research assistance. This is a revised version of the initial draft and not intended for further circulation.

[1] Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, *America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 2003), p. 13.

[2] See "Eroding Respect for America Seen as Major Problem," The Pew Research Center, 18 August 2004.

[3] Views of A Changing World, June 2003, Pew Global Attitudes Project, summarized on p. 3. The findings correspond to the results in a survey conducted a year later by Zogby, *Impressions of American 2004*, "How Arabs View America; How Arabs Learn About America."

[4] Francis Fukuyama, "U.S. vs Them" The Washington Post (Editorial), 11 September 2002. A17.

[5] Robert Kagan, "The US-Europe Divide," *The Washington Post*. 26 May 2002 and "Policy and Weakness," *Policy Review* (June and July 2002).

[6] See for example Craig Kennedy and Marshall Bouton, "The Real Trans-Atlantic Gap," *Foreign Policy*, October/November 2002; "Rebuilding the Atlantic Alliance," *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2003; and Andrew Moravcsik, "Striking a New Transatlantic Bargain," *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2003.

[7] Murray Hiebert and Barry Wain, "Same Planet, Different World," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 17 June 2004, pp. 26-27.

[8] Noordin Sopie quoted in Jane Perlez, "As U.S. Influence Wanes, A New Asian Community," *New York Times*, 4 November 2004.

[9] Global Public Opinion on the US Presidential Election and US Foreign Policy, (Globescan and the Program on International Policy Attitudes, 8 September 2004).

[10] Joo Sang-min, "South Korean Papers Urge Bush to Listen," *The Korea Herald*, 5 November 2004.

[11] *Global Views 2004: Comparing South Korean and American Public Opinion and Foreign Policy* (Chicago: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 2004).

[12] A December 2002 Gallup Korea survey paints a starker picture. It revealed that that the percentage of South Korean respondents having a "positive image" of the US is 37.2%; of Japan 30.3% ; of China 55% and of North Korea 47.4%. Thus South Koreans today "view their Cold War allies...more negatively than their Cold War enemies". Cited in Choong Nam Kim, "Changing Korean Perceptions of the Post-Cold War Era and the U.S.-ROK Alliance," *Asia Pacific Issues*, No. 67 (Honolulu: East-West Center, April 2003), p. 1.

[13] *Global Views 2004: American Public Opinion and Foreign Policy* (Chicago: The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 2004).

[14] This reinforces the finding of a separate poll conducted by Zogby International in August 2004. The study asked American respondents to choose one of three strategies for handling nuclear proliferation: (a) assert military strength, go it alone if necessary, and employ full military force to make Iran and North Korea comply; (b) employ a multilateral approach, with more reliance on allies like NATO and the UN; or (c) continue the current status of alliances in combination with the current level of military force. The responses were 61% in support of strategy B, 24% in support strategy C, and 11% in favour of strategy A. "Americans and the World Around Them: A Nationwide Poll," *Zogby International*, September 2004.

[15] The Zogby poll of August 2004 finds slightly less support for the ICC, 55% in support, 21% against but also finds that 25% weren't familiar with the court or sure. The respective numbers for the Kyoto Treaty were 42/21/37.

[16] This was the principal finding of a detailed 2002 study of opinion in the US and Europe conducted by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations. It found that American and European publics were about equally supportive of global institutions, especially the U.N., and international treaties including the ban on anti-personnel landmines and Kyoto. While Europeans are slightly more willing to use force for humanitarian purposes, publics in both support the use of force for a variety of purposes and favour multilateral over unilateral action strongly and by about the same margin. *Worldviews 2002: Comparing American and European Public Opinion on Foreign Policy* (Chicago: Chicago Council on Foreign Relations 2002).

[17] Scott Snyder, "Alliance and Alienation: Managing Diminished Expectations for U.S.-ROK Relations," *Comparative Connections*, Special Annual Issue, available on-line at <http://www.csis.org/pacfor/annual/2004annual.html>

[18] "Eroding Respect," August 2004, op. cit., p. 39, 40.

[19] Lexington, "One Nation After All," *The Economist*, 11 September 2004, p. 32.